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THESES
•	 Russia’s	 policy	 towards	 the	 conflict	 over	 the	 North	 Korean	
nuclear	program,	which	 in	2017-18	assumed	the	proportions	
of	a	serious	international	crisis,	has	been	subordinated	to	its	
geopolitical	goals	in	the	region	and	to	the	strategy	it	is	pursu-
ing	on	a	global	scale.	Its	long-term	goal	is	to	prevent	the	reuni-
fication	of	the	Korean	peninsula	under	the	aegis	of	the	United	
States	and	to	weaken	the	US’s	position	in	the	region.	Its	short-
term	goal	is	to	avert	the	danger	of	an	outbreak	of	armed	con-
flict	on	the	peninsula	and	the	possible	collapse	of	North	Korea.	
•	 Russia’s	support	for	the	reunification	of	the	two	Korean	states	
is	 purely	 declaratory;	 in	 practice	 the	 Kremlin	 is	 striving	 to	
maintain	the	political	status quo	on	the	peninsula.	At	the	same	
time,	 Russia	wants	 to	maximise	 its	 influence	 by	 developing	
economic	 relations	 and	 maintaining	 political	 contacts	 with	
both	Koreas.
•	 Moscow	 does	 not	 view	 the	 denuclearisation	 of	 North	 Korea	
as	 one	 of	 its	 priorities.	 Its	 approach	 to	 Pyongyang’s	 nuclear	
programme	 is	 instrumental;	 in	Moscow’s	eyes,	although	 the	
program	poses	certain	risks	for	Russia,	it	also	opens	a	number	
of	 opportunities.	 Officially,	 Moscow	 condemns	 Pyongyang’s	
nuclear	ambitions.	However,	until	autumn	2017	it	effectively	
blocked	Western	proposals	on	the	UN	Security	Council	to	im-
pose	economic	sanctions	on	the	Democratic	People’s	Republic	
of	Korea	(DPRK).
•	 The	course	of	 the	 crisis	 so	 far	has	demonstrated	 that	Russia	
does	not	have	sufficient	tools	to	influence	the	course	of	events.	
As	a	consequence,	 it	has	had	to	accept	a	role	as	China’s	 ‘jun-
ior	partner’	 in	 the	Korean	 issue.	Russia’s	 reduced	 role	 could	
be	best	seen	 in	August-September	2017	when,	under	China’s	
influence,	it	reversed	its	position	on	the	Security	Council	and	
approved	the	introduction	of	sanctions	against	the	DPRK.
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•	 The	Kremlin	was	 satisfied	with	 the	 results	 of	 the	 June	 2018	
meeting	between	US	President	Donald	Trump	and	the	North	
Korean	leader	Kim	Jong-un,	once	it	turned	out	that	they	would	
not	lead	to	a	rapid	denuclearisation	of	the	DPRK,	while	at	the	
same	time	reducing	 the	risk	of	American	military	action	on	
the	Korean	peninsula.	In	this	situation,	Moscow	made	every	
effort	to	conceal	the	fact	that	during	the	most	severe	stage	of	
the	crisis	in	2017,	its	role	turned	out	to	be	of	secondary	impor-
tance	compared	to	those	of	Washington,	Beijing	and	Seoul.	
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I. KorEa: ruSSIa’S ambITIonS and InTEnTIonS 
Russia’s	reactions	to	the	crisis1	were	mainly	determined	by	Mos-
cow’s	 geopolitical	 goals	 regarding	 the	 Korean	 peninsula.	 The	
crisis	itself	had	been	triggered	by	a	series	of	nuclear	and	missile	
tests	carried	out	by	North	Korea,	as	well	as	by	the	Trump	admin-
istration	toughening	its	policy	towards	the	regime	in	Pyongyang.	
Other	important	factors	determining	Russia’s	reactions	included	
the	broader	context	of	its	relations	with	both	the	United	States	and	
China,	as	well	as	its	business	interests	on	the	Korean	peninsula.	
Moscow’s	fundamental	and	long-term	geopolitical	goal	is	to	pre-
vent	the	‘German	reunification	scenario’	from	happening	in	Ko-
rea.	This	would	 involve	 South	Korea	 absorbing	 the	DPRK	while	
retaining	its	military	alliance	with	the	US	and	continuing	to	host	
American	troops	on	its	territory.	Russia	is	interested	in	strength-
ening	the	DPRK	as	an	anti-American	buffer	state,	and	in	modify-
ing	the	geopolitical	order	 in	North-East	Asia	by	way	of	creating	
a	regional	security	system	that	would	reduce	the	role	of	the	United	
States	in	the	region.	At	the	same	time,	Russia	seeks	to	maximise	
its	political	influence	and	economic	benefits	on	the	Korean	penin-
sula	by	developing	its	relations	with	both	Korean	states.
Moscow’s	short-term	goal	is	to	prevent	the	collapse	of	the	North	
Korean	state	and	the	outbreak	of	an	armed	conflict	on	the	penin-
sula.	To	achieve	this,	Russia	is	proposing	to	undertake	major	in-
frastructure	projects	(a	trans-Korean	gas	pipeline	and	railways,	
the	integration	of	electricity	grids),	which	would	give	it	additional	
tools	of	political	influence,	while	at	the	same	time	enabling	it	to	
obtain	economic	benefits.
1	 In	May	2017,	the	US	expert	on	Korea	Stephen	Noerper	wrote	that	“Tensions	
rose	to	the	highest	level	since	1993/1994.”	‘Peninsula	Tensions	Spike’,	Com-
parative Connections, vol.	19,	no.	1,	p.	33,	http://cc.csis.org/2017/05/peninsula-
tensions-spike/
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Russia	is	also	treating	the	conflict	around	Korea	as	an	instrument	
that	 it	 can	use	both	 to	put	pressure	on	 the	United	States	and	 to	
strengthen	its	relations	with	China.	It	calculates	that	the	prospect	
of	Russian	cooperation	in	resolving	the	crisis	on	Korean	peninsu-
la	might	help	to	persuade	Washington	to	maintain	relations	with	
Moscow	and	dissuade	it	from	attempts	to	isolate	Russia2.	It	is	also	
intended	to	motivate	Washington	to	make	concessions	to	Russia	
over	Ukraine.	On	the	other	hand,	by	cooperating	loyally	with	Chi-
na	over	the	Korean	issue,	Russia	intends	to	demonstrate	to	Beijing	
that	it	can	be	a	valuable	strategic	partner,	thus	working	to	tighten	
its	relations	with	China.	This	is	increasingly	important	for	Mos-
cow,	especially	 in	 the	context	of	 its	worsening	conflict	with	the	
US.	At	the	same	time,	it	seems	that	the	Kremlin	is	striving	to	con-
ceal	the	reduction	in	its	importance	in	the	geopolitical	game	over	
Korea	which	has	become	evident	during	the	recent	crisis.	The	re-
peated	 attempts	 to	 arrange	 either	 a	meeting	 between	Vladimir	
Putin	with	the	leader	of	North	Korea,	or	a	tri-partite	‘mini	sum-
mit’	between	the	Russian	president	and	the	leaders	of	the	two	Ko-
reas,	 appear	 to	 serve	 this	purpose.	Moscow	has	also	 repeatedly	
called	on	the	international	community	to	establish	a	multilateral	
mechanism	 to	 resolve	 the	conflict,	which	would	enable	 it	 to	di-
rectly	influence	the	course	and	content	of	the	negotiations.	
2	 For	example,	at	a	press	conference	following	his	meeting	with	the	US	Presi-
dent	in	Helsinki	(16	July	2018),	Putin	used	his	proposal	to	cooperate	in	the	
denuclearisation	of	the	DPRK	as	one	of	the	arguments	against	the	policy	of	
isolating	Russia.	He	suggested	that	this	was	one	of	the	areas	in	which	the	
interests	of	Russia	and	the	United	States	were	converging.
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II. THE nuclEar dPrK and ruSSIa’S 
gEoPolITIcal gaInS
Reactions	to	the	crisis	on	the	Korean	peninsula	in	2017–18	showed	
that	the	denuclearisation	of	North	Korea	is	not	one	of	Moscow’s	
principal	 goals.	The	 Kremlin	 intends	 to	 capitalise	 on	 the	 prob-
lem	of	Pyongyang’s	nuclear	programme,	treating	it	as	a	circum-
stance	 that	brings	Russia	 certain	benefits,	 even	 though	 it	poses	
some	risks.	Russia’s	policy	towards	the	DPRK’s	nuclear	ambitions	
is	subordinate	to	its	regional	and	global	geopolitical	goals,	as	well	
as	its	economic	interests.
Russia	does	not	view	the	DPRK’s	possession	of	nuclear	weapons	
as	 a	 direct	 threat3.	 Russian	 experts	 have	 emphasised	 that	 the	
North	Korean	nuclear	and	missile	arsenal	is	not	directed	against	
Moscow,	and	the	only	risk	would	come	from	an	accidental	land-
ing	of	a	malfunctioning	North	Korean	missile	on	Russian	terri-
tory.	It	is	noteworthy	that	once	the	DPRK	has	acquired	nuclear	
weapons,	 Russia’s	 proposals	 –	 as	 formulated	 alongside	 its	 de-
clared	support	for	full	denuclearisation	–	de facto point	towards	
the	 ‘legalisation’	 of	 North	 Korea’s	 nuclear	 status.	 This	 would	
be	the	result	 if	Washington	were	to	accept	Russia’s	proposal	to	
abandon	 sanctions	 (or	 at	 least	 reduce	 them),	 and	 to	 revive	 the	
Six-Party	Talks	which	were	launched	in	2003	and	discontinued	
in	20094.	Russian	experts	argue	that	the	full	denuclearisation	of	
North	Korea	is	a	Utopian	aim	because	no	authoritarian	regime	
3	 “In	fact,	Moscow	does	not	view	the	DPRK’s	nuclear	and	missile	activity	as	an	
immediate	military-political	threat	to	the	security	of	the	Russian	Federa-
tion,”	wrote	the	authors	of	a	report	published	by	the	prestigious	Moscow-
based	Institute	of	World	Economy	and	International	Relations	(IMEMO)	of	
the	Russian	Academy	of	Sciences	in	2018.	В.	Михеев,	А.	Федоровский	(ed.),	
Кризис и новая повестка дня для Корейского полуострова и региональных 
держав,	IMEMO	RAN,	Moscow	2018,	p.	56.	See	also	the	statement	by	Ser-
gey	Ryabkov,	Russia’s	deputy	foreign	minister,	in	reaction	to	North	Korea’s	
nuclear	tests	in	September	2017,	Говорить о возникновении ядерной угрозы 
России со стороны КНДР нельзя,	TASS,	4	September	2017.	
4	 This	 includes	 the	 DPRK,	 South	 Korea,	 the	 United	 States,	 China,	 Russia	
and	Japan.
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would	unilaterally	give	up	the	security	guarantees	provided	by	
its	possession	of	nuclear	weapons.	
At	the	same	time,	Russia	is	trying	to	use	the	nuclear	issue	to	pur-
sue	its	geopolitical	interests	in	the	region.	According	to	Russian	
diplomats,	 one	 of	 the	 prerequisites	 for	 the	 denuclearisation	 of	
the	DPRK	involves	creating	a	regional	security	system	in	North-
East	Asia.	Back	in	2007,	Russia	had	initiated	discussions	on	such	
a	system	in	the	framework	of	the	Six-Party	Talks,	and	assumed	
the	 chairmanship	 of	 a	working	 group	 appointed	 to	 devise	 the	
mechanisms	 and	 principles	 of	 this	 system.	 Moscow	 proposes	
that	this	system	should	be	based	on	the	principles	of	‘indivisibil-
ity	of	security’	and	a	‘non-bloc	nature’,	which	in	concrete	terms	
means	the	dissolution	or	weakening	of	the	US’s	military	allianc-
es	 in	 the	region,	and	Russia	gaining	a	right	of	veto	 in	regional	
security	matters.
Moscow’s	intention	to	capitalise	on	the	problem	of	North	Korea’s	
nuclear	ambitions	is	reflected	in	the	dual	nature	of	Russian	policy.	
On	 the	one	hand,	 the	Kremlin	condemns	 the	North	Korean	nu-
clear	programme	and	the	DPRK’s	withdrawal	from	the	Treaty	on	
the	Non-Proliferation	of	Nuclear	Weapons,	and	has	declared	that	
its	 aim	 is	 the	 full	 and	verifiable	denuclearisation	of	 the	Korean	
peninsula.	On	the	other,	Russian	diplomats	and	experts	have	con-
sistently	downplayed	the	North	Korean	nuclear	and	missile	pro-
gramme	since	the	1990s5.	They	have	also	accused	Washington	of	
exaggerating	the	threat	posed	by	this	programme	in	order	to	jus-
tify	the	expansion	of	its	military	presence	in	North-East	Asia	and	
increase	pressure	on	the	North	Korean	regime.	The	conviction	in	
Moscow	has	been	that	that	the	United	States	is	using	the	issue	of	
defending	the	non-proliferation	regime	as	a	‘smokescreen’	to	con-
ceal	the	true	aim	of	its	policy.	Allegedly,	this	aim	is	to	“extend	its	
5	 A	 sceptical	 assessment	of	North	Korea’s	 achievements	 is	 also	 evident	 in	
recent	analyses	by	Russian	experts,	see	С.	Лузянин,	Чжао	Хуашэн	(ed.),	
Российско-китайский диалог: модель 2018,	RSMD	2018,	p.	27;	Кризис	и	новая	
повестка…,	op. cit.,	p.	32.
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control	over	the	entire	Korean	peninsula	(…),	thereby	achieving	
a	radical	 shift	 in	 the	military	and	strategic	balance	of	power	 in	
North-East	Asia”6.	Russia	has	emphasised	that	the	DPRK’s	drive	to	
obtain	nuclear	weapons	was	a	natural	consequence	of	the	threat	
posed	 to	 Pyongyang	 by	 the	 US,	which	 refuses	 to	 recognise	 the	
North	Korean	regime	and	normalise	its	relations	with	it.	Hence,	
Russia	has	supported	North	Korea’s	demands	for	 ‘security	guar-
antees’	from	Washington	as	a	sine qua non	of	the	eventual	denu-
clearisation	of	the	DPRK.	Moscow	has	consistently	stated	that	any	
negotiations	over	the	DPRK’s	nuclear	issue	should	proceed	with-
out	 using	 any	military	 or	 economic	 pressure	 (sanctions).	 It	 has	
also	 supported	North	Korea’s	demands	 for	 economic	 compensa-
tion	from	Western	states	for	suspending	or	giving	up	its	nuclear	
programme.	
The	 most	 telling	 element	 of	 Moscow’s	 Korean	 policy	 was	 the	
negative	 position	 that	 Russian	 diplomacy	 had	maintained	 until	
autumn	 2017	 towards	 the	 US’s	 initiatives	 (which	 were	 usually	
supported	by	other	Western	powers,	 Japan	and	South	Korea)	on	
the	UN	 Security	 Council	 to	 impose	 economic	 sanctions	 against	
the	DPRK;	Russia	 either	blocked	 them	or	 insisted	on	 their	non-
obligatory	nature.	By	doing	so,	Russia	protected	the	DPRK	against	
the	economic	costs	of	its	nuclear	and	missile	policy.	Considering	
that	Moscow	has	repeatedly	resorted	to	such	sanctions	in	order	to	
put	pressure	on	its	foreign	partners	(for	example,	the	embargo	on	
Moldovan	wine	imposed	in	2006,	the	limitations	on	the	import	of	
goods	from	Ukraine	introduced	in	summer	2013,	and	the	econom-
ic	sanctions	against	Turkey	imposed	in	autumn	2016),	it	is	difficult	
to	believe	that	Russia’s	resistance	to	the	use	of	sanctions	against	
the	DPRK	is	rooted	 in	a	belief	about	 the	greater	effectiveness	of	
gentle	persuasion	and	 incentives	as	opposed	 to	sanctions.	How-
ever,	for	image-related	reasons,	Russia	cannot	openly	admit	that	
6	 А.	Жебин,	‘Корейский	конандрум’,	Проблемы Дальнего Востока	2/2018,	
p.	48.	The	author	is	a	director	of	the	Korean	Studies	Centre	at	the	Far	East	
Institute	of	the	Russian	Academy	of	Sciences.
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its	objection	to	the	DPRK’s	nuclear	programme	is	purely	declara-
tive	and	that	it	is	in	practice	ready	to	tolerate	it.	In	this	context,	
Moscow’s	 ambivalent	 attitude	 to	 the	 nuclear	 non-proliferation	
regime	is	also	relevant.	On	the	one	hand,	Russia	is	interested	in	
maintaining	the	ban	on	the	expansion	of	the	nuclear	states	club,	
while	on	the	other,	it	is	inclined	to	draw	geopolitical	advantages	
from	the	DPRK	and	Iran	violating	that	same	ban.
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III. ruSSIa’S ‘Two KorEaS PolIcy’ 
Russia’s	policy	of	maintaining	and	developing	good	relations	with	
both	Korean	states	dates	back	to	the	second	half	of	the	1990s.	It	was	
initiated	by	the	then	foreign	minister	Yevgeni	Primakov,	who	be-
lieved	that	Russia’s	exclusive	focus	on	relations	with	South	Korea	
and	the	de facto	freeze	of	its	relations	with	the	DPRK	(which	was	
the	case	in	1992–95),	contributed	to	its	marginalisation	in	the	re-
gion	and	the	weakening	of	Russia’s	position	vis-à-vis	South	Korea,	
and	was	a	sign	of	Russian	acceptance	of	being	the	United	States’	
‘junior	 partner’.	The	 attempts	 to	 rebuild	Russia’s	 relations	with	
the	 DPRK	which	 Primakov	 initiated	were	 revived	 by	 President	
Putin	shortly	after	he	assumed	office.	 In	February	2000,	Russia	
signed	a	new	friendship	treaty	with	the	DPRK	to	replace	the	now-
invalid	treaty	signed	in	Soviet	times,	and	in	July	2000	Vladimir	
Putin	was	the	first	Russian	president	to	visit	Pyongyang.	
The	 ostentatious	 rapprochement	 with	 North	 Korea	 (after	 the	 first	
meeting,	Putin	met	North	Korean	leader	Kim	Jong-il	twice	more,	 in	
2001	 and	 2002)	was	mainly	 intended	 to	 improve	 Russia’s	 image	 in	
Washington	and	Seoul	as	a	 state	whose	close	relations	with	Pyong-
yang	allowed	it	to	act	as	an	intermediary	between	the	DPRK	and	the	
US.	As	a	short-term	goal,	Putin	tried	to	use	his	first	meeting	with	the	
North	Korean	leader	to	strengthen	his	position	ahead	of	the	G8	sum-
mit	in	Okinawa	(the	meeting	in	Pyongyang	was	arranged	as	a	stopover	
visit	on	President	Putin’s	way	to	the	summit),	and	use	it	as	an	argu-
ment	against	the	plan	to	build	a	missile	defence	shield	announced	by	
the	new	US	administration7.	During	a	meeting	in	Vladivostok	in	Au-
gust	2002,	for	the	first	time	Russia	announced	its	readiness	to	build	
a	transit	railway	connection	crossing	the	territory	of	the	DPRK	to	link	
the	Trans-Siberian	Railway	and	 the	port	of	Busan	 in	South	Korea8.
7	 Putin	claims	to	have	received	a	promise	from	Kim	Jong-il	regarding	North	Ko-
rea’s	withdrawal	from	its	ballistic	missile	programme,	under	certain	conditions.
8	 Official	press	release	on	the	Kremlin’s	website,	23	August	2002,	http://krem-
lin.ru/events/president/news/27326
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During	these	meetings,	the	resumption	and	development	of	eco-
nomic	cooperation	was	announced,	although	the	intensity	of	eco-
nomic	relations	between	Russia	and	North	Korea	remained	very	
low.	Although	 their	mutual	 trade	 turnover	doubled	 in	 2001–5,	
to	reach	US$233	million	(which	was	a	peak	figure	in	post-Soviet	
times),	from	2006	it	fell	to	a	mere	US$49	million	in	2009,	stabi-
lising	at	the	level	of	around	US$100	million	in	2011–149.	The	bar-
riers	included	the	DPRK’s	unpaid	debt	(incurred	back	in	Soviet	
times),	as	well	as	North	Korea’s	chronic	shortage	of	convertible	
currencies.	 The	 only	 major	 Russian	 economic	 investment	 in	
the	DPRK	was	 the	construction	of	a	 terminal	at	 the	Rajin	Port	
worth	around	US$300	million,	carried	out	by	Russian	Railways	
(RZhD)	in	2008–14.	This	was	combined	with	the	modernisation	
of	a	54-kilometre	 long	stretch	of	railway	 line	connecting	Rajin	
and	 the	 Khasan	 railway	 station	 located	 on	 the	 Russian-North	
Korean	border10.	
At	the	beginning	of	this	decade,	Moscow	made	another	attempt	to	
revive	its	economic	cooperation	with	the	DPRK.	Above	all,	in	2012	
it	agreed	to	resolve	the	problem	of	North	Korea’s	debt	to	the	USSR	
of	 around	 US$11	 billion.	 Russia	 remitted	 90%	 of	 this	 debt	 and	
split	 the	 remaining	US$1.09	 billion	 into	 instalments	 to	 be	 paid	
over	twenty	years.	The	sums	repaid	were	to	be	spent	on	financ-
ing	joint	investments	in	the	field	of	humanitarian	and	energy	co-
operation11.	Another	method	of	developing	economic	cooperation	
involved	allowing	workers	from	the	DPRK	to	find	employment	in	
Russia.	The	relevant	agreement	between	Russia	and	North	Korea	
was	signed	in	2007	and	came	into	effect	 in	December	200912.	 In	
2010–15,	the	number	of	permits	issued	by	Russia	to	workers	from	
9	 L.	Zakharova,	‘Economic	Cooperation	between	Russia	and	North	Korea:	New	
goals	and	new	approaches’,	Journal of Eurasian Studies	7	(2016),	figure	1,	p.	156.
10	 L.	Zakharova,	ibidem,	p.	157.
11	 Russia	ratified	this	agreement	in	May	2014.
12	 Т.	Троякова,	‘Рабочая	сила	из	КНДР	на	российском	Дальном	Востоке:	
история	и	современность’,	Ойкумена,	2017,	no.	2,	p.	186.
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North	Korea	doubled,	from	21,000	to	over	40,00013.	Moreover,	in	
2014,	after	 three	years’	pause,	meetings	of	 the	 Intergovernmen-
tal	 Commission	 on	 Trade,	 Economic,	 Scientific	 and	 Technical	
Cooperation	were	resumed,	 the	Russian-North	Korean	Business	
Council	was	 established,	 and	Russian	 and	North	Korean	 banks	
opened	 mutual	 correspondent	 accounts	 to	 enable	 transactions	
in	roubles14.	All	these	measures	failed	to	bring	any	major	results.	
The	 big	 tri-partite	 investment	 projects	 (Russia–North	 Korea–
South	Korea)	which	Russia	has	proposed	since	the	beginning	of	
this	century	have	remained	in	the	realm	of	declarations,	and	in	
2016–17	trade	exchange	between	Russia	and	the	DPRK	fell	again	
(to	around	US$70	million	annually)15.	
Russia	maintains	contacts	with	the	DPRK	in	the	field	of	military	
and	military-technical	cooperation,	albeit	 in	a	discrete	manner;	
very	little	information	on	this	issue	is	publicly	available.	Accord-
ing	 to	 official	 sources,	 the	most	 recent	 contracts	 for	 the	 supply	
of	Russian-made	military	equipment	were	 signed	 in	200116.	The	
DPRK’s	military	is	mainly	equipped	with	Soviet-made	equipment,	
which	is	why	Russia	has	continued	to	service	it	and	provide	spare	
parts.	Russia’s	defence	minister	Sergei	Shoigu	revealed	that	“sev-
eral”	 agreements	had	been	 signed	 in	 this	field,	while	 announc-
ing	that	Russia	had	suspended	its	military-technical	cooperation	
with	the	DPRK	in	connection	with	the	sanctions	adopted	by	the	
UN	Security	Council	in	autumn	2017.	According	to	explanations	
13	 L.	Zakharova,	‘Economic	Cooperation	between	Russia	and	North	Korea:	New	
goals	and	new	approaches’,	op. cit.,	p.	158–159.
14	 The	Commission	met	again	in	2015;	then	there	was	a	pause	of	two	years,	and	
another	meeting	was	held	in	March	2018.	L.	Zakharova,	‘Russia-North	Korea	
Economic	Relations’	in	Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies	27	(2016),	p.	213,	216;	
http://tass.ru/ekonomika/5054861
15	 Торговля между Россией и КНДР (Северной Кореей) в 2017 г.,	15	February	2018,	
http://russian-trade.com/reports-and-reviews/2018-02/torgovlya-mezhdu-
rossiey-i-kndr-severnoy-koreey-v-2017-g/
16	 This	was	a	contract	for	the	supply	of	armoured	vehicles;	В.	Волощак,	Военно-
техническое сотрудничество Российской Федерации и Корейской Народно-
Демократической Республики с 1991 г.,	 http://militaryrussia.ru/forum/
download/file.php?id=1068
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provided	by	Aleksandr	Matsegora,	Russia’s	ambassador	to	Pyong-
yang,	 these	 agreements	 cover	 the	 post-warranty	 servicing	 of	
Soviet-	and	Russian-made	military	equipment17.	
In	November	 2015,	 Russia	 signed	 an	 agreement	with	 the	DPRK	
on	preventing	dangerous	military	activities18,	pursuant	to	which	
a	 joint	 military	 committee	 was	 established.	 The	 committee	 is	
scheduled	to	hold	meetings	at	least	once	a	year;	its	first	meeting	
was	held	 in	December	2017	 in	Pyongyang19.	By	establishing	 this	
committee,	Russia	has	created	a	direct	channel	of	communication	
with	North	Korea’s	armed	forces	(the	agreement	contains	detailed	
provisions	regarding	the	procedures	of	establishing	direct	radio	
contact	between	representatives	of	both	countries’	armed	forces).	
In	contrast	to	the	stagnation	in	Russia’s	economic	relations	with	
the	DPRK,	its	economic	cooperation	with	South	Korea	has	flour-
ished	this	century.	Over	fifteen	years	(2000–14),	 trade	turnover	
rose	from	US$2.8	billion	to	US$25.8	billion	(with	a	temporary	de-
cline	in	2009	from	US$18	billion	to	US$10	billion	due	to	the	global	
economic	crisis).	Although	it	declined	again	in	2015–16,	this	time	to	
US$13	billion,	in	2017	it	reached	US$19	billion.	South	Korean	com-
panies	have	carried	out	intensive	investment	activities	in	Russia,	
in	particular	in	2006–9,	and	at	the	end	of	2016	their	investments	
were	 worth	 US$2.5	 billion.	 South	 Korea	 has	 become	 Russia’s	
sixth	biggest	trade	partner	in	terms	of	trade	volume	(outside	the	
CIS	area).	However,	taking	into	account	South	Korea’s	economic
17	 Александр Мацегора: любое сотрудничество с КНДР сейчас упи ра ется в 
санкции,	RIA	Novosti,	18	July	2018,	https://ria.ru/20180718/1524836372.html
18	 Соглашение между Правительством Российской Федерации и Прави тель-
ством Корейской Народно-Демократической Республики о предотвращении 
опасной военной деятельности,	http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/inter-
national_contracts/2_contract/-/storage-viewer/bilateral/page-20/43776
19	 See	 the	 press	 release	 published	 by	 the	 Embassy	 of	 the	 Russian	 Federa-
tion	 in	 Pyongyang,	 http://www.rusembdprk.ru/ru/posolstvo/novosti-
posolstva/601-delegatsiya-ministerstva-oborony-rossii-v-kndr
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Figure 1. Trade turnover between Russia and South Korea, 2000–16
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Source:	Ли	Чжэ	Ён,	‘Новая	«Северная	политика»	и	корейско-российское	
сот	рудничество’,	Валдайские записки,	No	76,	Октябрь	2017,	p.	6	(based	on	
data	from	KITA).
Figure 2. South Korean investments in Russia
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Source:	Ли	Чжэ	Ён,	‘Новая	«Северная	политика»	и	корейско-российское	
сот	руд	ничество’,	Валдайские записки,	No	76,	Октябрь	2017,	p.	7	(based	on	
data	from	KEXIM).
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potential20	 and	 the	major	 investment	projects	 announced	during	
successive	meetings	between	top-ranking	politicians	(in	particular	
during	President	Putin’s	visit	to	Seoul	in	2013),	the	results	of	this	
cooperation	have	not	been	very	impressive.	This	has	triggered	“dis-
appointment	and	distrust	on	the	part	of	South	Korea”21.	At	present,	
economic	cooperation	with	Russia	is	of	minor	significance	to	South	
Korea:	Russia’s	share	in	South	Korean	exports	is	a	mere	1.2%,	and	
2.5%	in	 its	 imports22.	Even	as	a	supplier	of	fuel,	Russia	has	failed	
to	achieve	any	significant	position	on	the	Korean	market;	 for	ex-
ample	in	2017	the	import	of	Russian	oil	and	liquefied	gas	accounted	
for	a	mere	5%	of	South	Korea’s	import	of	these	commodities23.	Co-
operation	in	the	ship-building	industry	is	of	some	significance,	al-
though	due	to	the	size	of	the	South	Korean	ship-building	sector	this	
is	 rather	 limited24.	 South	 Korean	 companies	 (Daewoo,	 Samsung,	
STX)	hold	a	de facto	monopoly	on	the	supply	of	ships	transporting	
liquefied	gas	for	the	Russian	state-controlled	ship-owning	compa-
ny	Roskomflot	(eleven	ships	were	launched	in	2007–15,	and	another	
20	 Russia’s	share	in	South	Korea’s	foreign	trade	is	less	than	2%,	and	the	share	
of	South	Korean	investment	in	Russia	is	less	than	2%	of	its	foreign	invest-
ments.	Ли	Чже	Ён,	‘Новая	„Северная	политика”	и	корейско-российское	
сотрудничество’, Валдайские записки,	October	2017,	no.	76,	p.	6–7;	http://
ru.valdaiclub.com/files/22115/
21	 Ibidem.
22	 Data	 for	 2017.	The	 author’s	 own	 calculation,	 based	 on	 data	 available	 on	
the	 official	websites	 of	 South	Korea’s	 customs	 service,	 http://www.cus-
toms.go.kr/kcshome/trade/TradeCountryList.do?layoutMenuNo=21031,	
http://english.motie.go.kr/en/if/tb/trade/tradeList.do
23	 Calculated	 based	 on	 data	 after	 Оперативные данные по статистке 
внешней торговли Российской Федерации за 2017 г.,	p.	1,	Tab.	3,	p.	6,	Tab.	7,	
p.	10;	Оперативные данные по статистике внешней торговли Российской 
Федерации за I-II кв. 2018 года,	p.	1,	chart	3,	p.	7,	chart	8,	p.	12,	available	on	the	
website	of	the	Ministry	of	Economic	Development	of	the	Russian	Federation,	
http://www.ved.gov.ru/exportcountries/kr/analytic_kr/?analytic=26
24	 In	2007–15,	the	annual	value	of	export	generated	by	the	Korean	shipbuilding	
sector	was	US$27–57	billion,	US$39	billion	on	average.	Korea in Global Value 
Chains: Pathways for Industrial Transformation (Joint Project between GVCC and 
KIET),	chapter	4,	figure	16,	p.	42,	https://gvcc.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/
Duke_KIET_Korea_and_the_Shipbuilding_GVC_CH_4.pdf	
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will	be	launched	in	2020)25.	The	South	Korean	company	Hyundai	
is	involved	in	the	construction	of	a	floating	LNG	terminal	for	Ka-
liningrad26.	Several	South	Korean	companies	have	established	joint	
ventures	with	Russian	companies	in	the	ship-building	sector	in	the	
Far	East,	with	the	aim	of	building	tankers	and	ice	breakers	on	com-
mission	from	Russian	companies	operating	in	the	oil	and	gas	sector	
and	from	the	Russian	state27.
In	the	context	of	the	development	of	economic	relations	with	South	
Korea,	Moscow	has	openly	declared	that	it	does	not	intend	to	allow	
Seoul	to	exploit	these	ties	to	exert	pressure	on	Russia’s	policy	towards	
the	DPRK28.	Despite	repeated	declarations	during	the	presidencies	of	
Lee	Myung-bak	(2008–13)	and	Park	Geun-hye	(2013–17),	 the	South	
Korean	side	has	attempted	to	use	economic	cooperation	as	a	‘carrot’	
to	persuade	Russia	to	put	pressure	on	the	DPRK,	but	to	no	avail.
25	 Roskomflot’s	 official	 website:	 http://sovcomflot.ru/en/f leet/f leetlist/
item388.html
26	 Котел – регазификатор на строящемся в Южной Корее для Кали нинградской 
области плавучем СПГ-терминале (FSRU) Маршал Васи левский при 
испытаниях поврежден. За чей счет будет замена?,	16	May	2018,	https://
neftegaz.ru/news/view/171507-Kotel-regazifikator-na-stroyaschemsya-v-
Yuzhnoy-Koree-dlya-Kaliningradskoy-oblasti-plavuchem-SPG-terminale-
FSRU-Marshal-Vasilevskiy-pri-ispytaniyah-povrezhden.-Za-chey-schet-
budet-zamena
27	 X.	Zeng,	South Korean shipbuilders sign JV agreements with Russian peers,	12	Sep-
tember	 2017,	 https://fairplay.ihs.com/ship-construction/article/4291516/
south-korean-shipbuilders-sign-jv-agreements-with-russian-peers;	 Ini-
tially,	the	agreement	covered	up	to	29	vessels	(tankers,	ice	breakers),	but	
the	status	of	these	orders	is	unclear.	‘РФ	заказала	у	Южной	Кореи	стр	ои-
тельство	29	судов,	включая	15	танкеров-ледоколов’,	TASS,	16	July	2018,	
https://tass.ru/vef-2018/articles/5376871
28	 At	this	point	it	is	worth	mentioning	an	article	published	by	Russian	diplomats	
in	2005,	in	which	they	warned	Seoul	not	to	yield	to	“romantic	expectations”	
in	connection	with	the	development	of	economic	cooperation	with	Russia,	
and	emphasised	that	“it	is	important	that	the	authorities	in	Seoul	should	not	
demand	that	Russia	should	constantly	put	pressure	on	the	DPRK,	encourage	
Pyongyang	to	make	specific	decisions	that	the	South	Korean	side	may	be	
interested	in	[…]	One	should	not	intend	to	achieve	specific	benefits	at	Rus-
sia’s	cost,	to	the	detriment	of	its	relations	with	North	Korea”.	А.	Торкунов,	
В.	Денисов,	‘Россия-Корея:	взгляд	из	прошлого	в	настоящее’,	Мировая 
экономика и международные отношения,	2005,	no.	1.	
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Military-technical	 cooperation	 has	 a	 special	 place	 in	Moscow’s	
relations	with	Seoul.	In	military	affairs,	South	Korea	cooperates	
closely	with	the	United	States.	Therefore,	it	is	a	paradox	that	this	
is	the	field	in	which	Russia	has	become	an	important	and	seem-
ingly	 almost	 irreplaceable	 partner.	 The	 starting	 point	 for	 this	
cooperation,	back	in	the	second	half	of	the	1990s,	lay	in	the	sup-
plies	of	Russian	military	equipment	as	repayment	of	a	portion	of	
the	Soviet	debt	inherited	by	the	Russian	Federation	amounting	to	
US$2.1	billion29.	A	major	improvement	in	the	quality	of	this	coop-
eration	became	evident	following	President	Roh	Moo-hyun’s	visit	
to	Moscow	in	September	2004,	when	the	Russian	side	agreed	to	
repay	the	remaining	portion	of	the	debt	by	providing	technology	
and	know-how	for	the	construction	of	the	South	Korean	KSLV-1	
carrier	rocket	and	assisting	in	the	creation	of	the	Korean	space-
port	known	as	the	Naro	Space	Center.	Officially,	this	cooperation	
covered	the	civilian	sector,	but	the	experience	(and	probably	also	
the	technology)	gained	during	the	programme’s	implementation	
laid	 the	 essential	 basis	 for	 the	Korean	military	 rocket	 building	
programme.	Alongside	 this,	 Russian	 arms-manufacturing	 com-
panies	 (Almaz-Antey	 and	 Fakel)	 cooperated	 with	 South	 Korea	
on	 the	 construction	 and	 deployment	 of	 KM-SAM	 (Cheongung),	
a	modern	aerial	and	missile	defence	system30.	
Regardless	of	its	developing	cooperation	with	both	Korean	states,	
Russia	is	not	interested	in	the	political	reunification	of	the	Korean	
29	 ‘Russia	to	Settle	Soviet	Debt	in	2017’,	The Moscow Times,	17	February	2017,	
https://themoscowtimes.com/news/russia-to-settle-its-soviet-debts-be-
end-of-2017-57193
30	 Ён	Сонг	Хым,	Россия и Республика Корея: взгляд из Сеула,	March	2012,	
https://interaffairs.ru/jauthor/material/628;	 В.	 Самсонова,	 Сотру дни-
чество России и Южной Кореи в области науки, техники и образования,	
30	 September	 2013,	 http://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/
analytics/sotrudnichestvo-rossii-i-yuzhnoy-korei-v-oblasti-nauki-tekhn/;	
М.	 Казанин,	 Корейские оружейники загорелись от нашего «Факела»,	
18	April	2017,	https://vpk-news.ru/articles/36289;	S.	Roblin,	South Korea is 
deploying its own missile shield,	 12	October	2017,	https://warisboring.com/
south-korea-deploys-its-own-missile-shield/;	M.	Piotrowski,	‘South	Korea’s	
Ballistic	and	Cruise	Missiles’,	PISM Bulletin 57,	18	April	2018.
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peninsula,	especially	as	the	only	possible	scenario	for	such	reuni-
fication	(due	to	the	two	states’	differing	potentials)	would	be	the	
absorption	of	the	DPRK	by	South	Korea.	This	is	why	the	Russian	
leadership	(President	Vladimir	Putin	himself,	as	well	as	Foreign	
Minister	Sergei	Lavrov),	when	declaring	its	support	for	the	idea	
of	a	reunification	of	the	Korean	nation	and	promising	assistance	
in	 its	 implementation,	has	 at	 the	 same	 time	 formulated	a	num-
ber	of	conditions	that	need	to	be	met,	and	which	would	make	the	
prospect	of	reunification	de facto	unattainable.	In	2013,	President	
Putin	said	that	the	reunification	process	should	not	only	be	peace-
ful,	but	also	that	it	should	proceed	“while	taking	into	account	the	
interests	of	both	the	northern	and	the	southern	part	of	the	penin-
sula”,	and	that	“nothing	should	be	forced	on	the	partners”	during	
its	implementation31.	The	requirement	to	take	the	interests	of	the	
North	Korean	regime	during	the	process	of	reunification	into	ac-
count	–	as	this	is	how	President	Putin’s	declaration	should	be	in-
terpreted	–	would	in	practice	mean	blocking	the	process.	In	a	de-
bate	on	a	hypothetical	model	of	reunification	that	Russia	would	
accept,	Russian	experts	and	diplomats	have	cited	other	conditions	
as	well:	these	include	the	neutral	status	of	a	hypothetically	united	
Korea	 (i.e.	 the	 breaking	 of	 the	military	 alliance	 between	South	
Korea	and	the	United	States),	the	removal	of	American	troops,	and	
the	adoption	by	the	unified	state	of	a	policy	involving	maintaining	
equally	close	relations	with	the	United	States,	Russia	and	China.	
There	is	no	doubt	that	the	experience	connected	with	the	reunifi-
cation	of	Germany	has	affected	Russia’s	attitude	towards	the	pos-
sible	reunification	of	the	Koreas.	According	to	a	leading	Russian	
expert	on	Korean	affairs,	 from	Russia’s	point	of	view	the	emer-
gence	of	a	united	pro-American	Korea	would	be	“equivalent	to	the	
emergence	near	our	eastern	borders	of	an	Asian	clone	of	NATO”32.	
31	 President	Putin’s	interview	for	the	Korean	Broadcasting	System:	Интервью 
южнокорейской телерадиокомпании KBS,	12	November	2013,	http://krem-
lin.ru/events/president/news/19603
32	 A.	Zhebin,	‘Russia's	Vision	of	Re-unified	Korea's	Place…’,	op. cit.,	p.	113.
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IV. THE KorEan crISIS and ITS conSEquEncES 
for ruSSIan-cHInESE rElaTIonS 
The	aggravation	of	 tension	around	the	DPRK	and	its	nuclear	&	
missile	 programme	 in	 2017	 came	 as	 a	major	 challenge	 for	 the	
Kremlin,	 which	 now	 had	 to	 take	 into	 account	 that	 President	
Trump	would	 not	 refrain	 from	 using	 force	 against	 the	 DPRK.	
An	outbreak	of	armed	conflict	that	could	involve	the	use	of	nu-
clear	weapons	would	entail	a	series	of	negative	consequences	for	
the	Kremlin.	Firstly,	the	conflict	would	take	place	on	territory	
that	borders	Russia,	which	could	cause	economic	 losses	due	 to	
the	disruption	to	the	normal	operation	of	transportation	routes	
in	the	region.	Other	consequences	include	the	risk	of	a	massive	
wave	of	refugees	from	the	DPRK,	and	the	risk	of	human	and	ma-
terial	losses	caused	by	friendly	fire.	However,	more	importantly,	
the	American	military	action	might	be	successful	(and	could	re-
sult	 in	the	elimination	of	the	North	Korean	nuclear	potential),	
and	–	in	the	worst-case	scenario	–	could	cause	the	collapse	of	the	
North	 Korean	 regime.	 A	 successful	 military	 campaign	 would	
also	significantly	strengthen	the	position	of	 the	United	States,	
which	 the	 Kremlin	 considers	 its	 main	 geopolitical	 rival	 and	
a	source	of	threat	to	the	existence	of	Putin’s	regime.	A	collapse	of	
the	DPRK	would	mean	either	the	prospect	of	the	‘German	vari-
ant’	of	the	reunification	of	Korea,	or	the	need	to	carry	out	a	mili-
tary	intervention	together	with	China	to	maintain	North	Korea	
as	a	buffer	state33.	
On	the	other	hand,	a	situation	in	which	the	DPRK	yielded	to	the	
US’s	demands,	combined	with	the	threat	of	the	use	of	force,	would	
not	 be	 favourable	 for	 the	Kremlin	 because	 it	would	 strengthen	
the	position	of	the	United	States	(as	would	a	successful	American	
military	action).	The	further	tightening	of	 the	sanctions	regime	
33	 This	scenario	is	discussed	by	A.	Lukin	in	‘The	North	Korea	Nuclear	Problem	
and	the	US-China-Russia	Strategic	Triangle’,	Russian Analytical Digest	209,	
24	October	2017.	
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which	the	US	proposes	would	be	unfavourable	for	Russia	because	
–	if	it	proved	successful	–	it	could	lead	to	the	collapse	of	the	regime	
in	Pyongyang.	Moreover,	it	would	stand	in	contrast	to	the	Krem-
lin’s	declared	hard-line	attitude	towards	economic	sanctions	as	an	
unacceptable	method	of	pressure.
The	course	of	the	crisis	so	far	has	demonstrated	that	Russia	does	
not	have	sufficient	tools	at	its	disposal	to	influence	the	develop-
ment	 of	 events.	 It	 seems	 that	 the	 awareness	 of	 this	 fact,	 com-
bined	with	the	need	to	demonstrate	close	relations	with	China	
(triggered	by	the	crisis	in	Moscow’s	relations	with	Washington),	
has	encouraged	the	Russian	leadership	to	take	an	unprecedent-
ed	 step.	This	 step	 involved	 formulating	 the	 initiative	 (together	
with	China)	of	the	so-called	double	freeze,	proposed	by	the	two	
countries’	foreign	ministers	during	the	Chinese	President	Xi	Jin-
ping’s	 visit	 to	Moscow	on	 4	 July	 2018.	This	 boiled	 down	 to	 the	
DPRK	 freezing	 its	 nuclear	 and	missile	 tests	 and	 a	 concurrent	
suspension	 of	 joint	 American-Korean	 military	 exercises	 “on	
a	large	scale”34.
Another	 important	 fact	 is	 that	 during	 the	UN	Security	Council	
sessions	in	August	and	September	2017	dedicated	to	adopting	fur-
ther	sanctions	against	North	Korea	(which	this	time	were	to	have	
been	really	painful	for	the	regime),	the	Chinese	diplomats	alleg-
edly	urged	their	Russian	colleagues	not	to	make	any	delay	in	ap-
proving	them35.
It	is	likely	that	the	cases	of	Russian	companies	violating	the	sanc-
tions	 (the	 smuggling	 of	 oil,	 illegal	 imports	 of	 coal	 and	marine	
products)	which	Western	 intelligence	services	have	uncovered	
were	carried	out	by	Moscow	with	the	tacit	agreement	of	China.	
34	 For	 the	declaration’s	 content,	 see	http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/
news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2807662
35	 А.	Ланьков,	‘Как	Россия	относится	к	новым	санкциям	против	Северной	
Кореи’,	16	January	2018,	www.carnegie.ru/commentary/75259
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Officially,	Beijing	intended	to	force	North	Korea	to	make	conces-
sions	and	‘punish’	Kim	Jong-un	for	ignoring	its	‘advice’	by	adopt-
ing	harsh	 sanctions.	Another	 intention	was	 to	 demonstrate	 to	
the	US	 that	China	 is	 ready	 to	 change	 its	 former	policy	of	 ‘pro-
tecting’	the	DPRK	to	reduce	the	risk	of	Trump	deciding	to	launch	
military	action.	On	the	other	hand,	China	does	not	want	to	trig-
ger	 the	 destabilisation	 of	 the	 regime.	 In	 this	 situation,	 Russia	
(whose	relations	with	Washington	have	deteriorated	and	whose	
image	 in	 the	West	was	unfavourable)	could	agree	to	do	Beijing	
a	‘diplomatic	favour’.
In	 the	diplomatic	manoeuvres	around	the	 issue	of	North	Korea,	
which	have	been	ongoing	for	a	year	and	a	half,	Moscow’s	role	has	
clearly	 been	 less	 prominent	 than	 that	 of	 Beijing.	The	most	 evi-
dent	manifestation	of	Beijing’s	dominance	has	been	the	fact	that	
the	North	Korean	 leader	Kim	Jong-un	has	 travelled	 to	China	up	
to	 three	 times	 to	hold	 talks	with	China’s	 leader	Xi	 Jinping.	 It	 is	
noteworthy	that	his	third	visit	was	organised	on	19–20	June,	al-
most	immediately	after	his	meeting	with	Trump	in	Singapore	on	
12	June.	
The	 North	 Korean	 leader’s	 readiness	 to	 consult	 his	 decisions	
with	Beijing	stood	in	contrast	with	his	ignoring	the	attempts	by	
Russian	diplomats	to	arrange	a	meeting	between	him	and	Putin	
ahead	of	the	Singapore	summit.	The	only	thing	that	Russia’s	for-
eign	minister	Sergei	Lavrov	managed	to	achieve	during	his	visit	
to	Pyongyang	on	31	May	was	a	rather	vague	prospect	of	a	meet-
ing	between	the	North	Korean	 leader	and	President	Putin	 to	be	
held	before	the	end	of	2018.	For	the	time	being,	Putin	has	had	to	
make	do	with	a	meeting	with	Kim	Yong-nam,	the	President	of	the	
Presidium	of	 the	Supreme	People’s	Assembly	of	North	Korea,	 in	
Moscow	on	14	June.	During	this	meeting,	Putin	reiterated	his	invi-
tation	to	Kim	Jong-un,	communicated	to	the	North	Korean	leader	
by	Lavrov	in	May,	and	emphasised	the	flexibility	of	the	Russian	
side	to	receive	Kim	Jong-un,	either	at	the	Eastern	Economic	Forum	
in	Vladivostok	or	in	the	formula	of	a	specially	arranged	individual	
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visit36.	However,	the	North	Korean	leader	did	not	appear	at	the	Fo-
rum,	and	the	timing	of	his	visit	to	Russia	remains	unspecified37.	
36	 Встреча	с	Председателем	Президиума	Верховного	народного	собрания	
КНДР	Ким	Ён	Намом,	14	June	2018,	http://kremlin.ru/events/president/
news/57784
37	 See	statement	by	Yuri	Ushakov,	Aide	to	the	President	of	the	Russian	Federa-
tion	responsible	for	international	affairs,	Ясности с возможным визитом 
Ким Чен Ына на форум во Владивосток пока нет,	Interfax,	24	July	2018.
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V. THE SummIT In SIngaPorE from 
THE ruSSIan PErSPEcTIVE: wHaT nExT?
Although	Russia	did	not	play	a	major	part	in	making	the	Amer-
ican-North	Korean	summit	meeting	happen,	Moscow	welcomed	
the	meeting’s	results	with	evident	relief.	For	Russia,	the	elimina-
tion	of	the	risk	of	armed	conflict	was	the	most	important	result.	
Official	 statements	 emphasised	 that	 the	 summit	has	 set	 a	 prec-
edent,	 and	 expressed	 optimistic	 expectations	 as	 to	 the	 further	
development	of	the	situation	around	Korea.	According	to	Russian	
diplomats,	the	meeting	demonstrated	that	the	main	actors	have	de 
facto	adopted	the	Russian-Chinese	formula	of	the	‘double	freeze’,	
which	was	intended	to	emphasise	Russia’s	contribution	to	an	(at	
least	temporary)	containment	of	the	crisis.	For	their	part,	experts	
and	media	commentators	mainly	emphasised	the	absence	of	con-
crete	conclusions	in	the	declaration	adopted	at	the	summit.	A	the-
sis	has	also	been	formulated	that	the	meeting	was	a	de facto	sur-
render	by	President	Trump,	because	by	holding	this	meeting	he	
legitimised	the	North	Korean	leader	and	welcomed	his	statement	
regarding	his	 readiness	 to	negotiate	 the	denuclearisation	of	 the	
Korean	peninsula	(rather	than	to	eliminate	North	Korea’s	nuclear	
potential).	Moreover,	 the	US	President	has	withdrawn	from	the	
demands	he	had	formulated	ahead	of	the	summit	to	request	that	
Pyongyang	produce	a	detailed	plan	for	denuclearisation.	
From	the	Kremlin’s	point	of	view,	the	meeting	has	brought	near-
ly	optimum	results.	The	talks	between	Trump	and	Kim	Jong-un	
have	 reduced	 the	 risk	 of	 an	American	military	 intervention	 on	
the	peninsula	to	a	minimum.	At	the	same	time,	they	did	not	cre-
ate	any	clear	prospect	for	the	rapid	resolution	of	the	conflict	or	the	
elimination	of	North	Korea’s	nuclear	potential.	In	fact,	they	have	
opened	up	the	prospect	of	launching	a	process	of	long-lasting	ne-
gotiations	and	bargaining	between	Washington	and	Pyongyang,	
during	which	Moscow	may	attempt	to	act	as	an	essential	interme-
diary.	It	may	also	use	this	situation	to	normalise	its	relations	with	
the	United	States	and	strengthen	its	bargaining	position	vis-à-vis	
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  1
2/
20
18
27
Washington,	as	well	as	to	gain	additional	opportunities	for	devel-
oping	 its	 economic	 cooperation	with	both	Korean	 states,	 and	 to	
rebuild	its	image	as	an	independent	and	essential	actor	in	the	dip-
lomatic	game	around	Korea.	
Russian	diplomats	have	emphasised	that	a	permanent	resolution	
to	the	problem	of	North	Korea’s	nuclear	potential	requires	multi-
lateral	negotiations	between	all	the	interested	parties	(preferably	
in	the	formula	of	a	resumption	of	 the	Six-Party	Talks	 including	
the	 two	Koreas,	China,	Russia,	 the	United	States	 and	 Japan).	At	
the	same	time,	Russia	has	launched	attempts	in	the	UN	Security	
Council	to	ease	the	sanctions	against	the	DPRK38.	The	Kremlin	had	
been	hoping	that	it	would	manage	to	use	its	good	relations	with	
the	two	Korean	states	to	organise	a	spectacular	meeting	between	
the	leaders	of	the	two	Koreas	at	the	Eastern	Economic	Forum	in	
Vladivostok	in	September	201839.	These	attempts	ultimately	failed	
because	the	two	Korean	leaders	declined	Russia’s	 invitation	and	
organised	a	summit	meeting	themselves,	thereby	demonstrating	
that	they	had	no	need	of	Russia’s	mediation40.
The	2017–18	crisis	has	mainly	demonstrated	how	Russia’s	policy	
of	 capitalising	 on	 regional	 tensions	 and	 North	 Korea’s	 nuclear	
ambitions	to	engage	in	geopolitical	rivalry	with	the	United	States	
has	 led	 to	Russia	 becoming	Beijing’s	 ‘junior	 partner’	 in	 the	Ko-
rean	issue.	 In	the	North-East	Asian	context,	Russia’s	strategy	of	
strengthening	Moscow’s	bargaining	position	by	nurturing	its	re-
lations	with	a	state	that	is	attempting	to	obtain	nuclear	weapons	
and	is	in	conflict	with	the	United	States	(a	similar	strategy	to	that	
which	it	used	towards	Iran)	has	proved	counter-productive,	and	
38	 Россия допустила возможность поднятия вопроса о санкциях против КНДР 
в ООН,	RIA	Novosti,	18	July	2018;	‘РФ	выступает	за	постепенное	смягчение	
санкций	против	КНДР’,	RIA	Novosti,	26	July	2018.
39	 М.	Коростиков,	Юг и Север Кореи ждут во Владивостоке,	 30	 July	 2018,	
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3700528
40	 Statement	by	Yuri	Ushakov,	Aide	to	the	President	of	the	Russian	Federation	
responsible	for	international	affairs,	Interfax,	20	August	2018.	
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has	contributed	to	Russia’s	relative	marginalisation.	There	 is	no	
indication	that	Moscow	is	ready	to	fundamentally	revise	the	as-
sumptions	 of	 its	 foreign	 policy;	 it	 should	 therefore	 be	 expected	
that	its	further	actions	will	focus	on	posing	as	an	‘essential’	par-
ticipant	 in	 the	 geopolitical	 game	 that	 is	 ongoing	 around	Korea,	
and	at	the	same	time	on	the	continued	and	unavoidable	‘coordina-
tion’	of	Russia’s	policy	with	that	of	Beijing.	
Witold RodkieWicz
